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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2018, the State of Ohio filed suit against Precourt Sports
Ventures (hereinafter “Precourt”) to enjoin Precourt from relocating their
soccer franchise, the Columbus Crew, to Austin, Texas.1 Ohio alleged that
Precourt and Major League Soccer (MLS) were legally prevented from
relocating the team because of a unique Ohio statute which called for certain
conditions to be satisfied before any professional sports team in the state
could relocate.2 The case was dismissed on appeal because the court lacked
jurisdiction, immediately shutting the door on exploring the team-city
relationship of professional sports teams.3 Nevertheless, the suit shed light
on a question that has yet to be answered: do municipalities have any
protections in place to prevent a professional sports team’s relocation when
the team’s stadium is built using the municipality’s own tax funds?

*

J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.B.A., 2017, George
Washington University. I would like to thank all the members and editors of the Seton Hall
Legislative Journal for their hard work with this comment, and a special thanks to my family
for their support and encouragement throughout my law school career.
1
See generally State ex rel. DeWine v. Precourt Sports Ventures LLC, 2018-Ohio2414, 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).
2
Id. at 1.
3
Id. at 4.
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Professional sports teams, like all other for-profit businesses, prioritize
profit maximization.4 Thus, when an out-of-state move seems fiscally
advantageous for a team, it is unlikely that any loyalty to the present domain
will prevail.5 Municipalities may find themselves strong-armed by a team’s
threat of relocation, resulting in the municipality making concessions that it
would otherwise not make.6 In such situations, state and local governments
are seemingly stuck between the proverbial rock and a hard place; they must
weigh upgrading or building a new stadium for the team against investing
those same funds into other more essential services, such as education.7 As
stadiums become more expensive to build, maintain and operate, cities and
teams alike are recognizing that it is essential to protect such large
investments.8 Today, those protections remain nonexistent in most
jurisdictions.9 This comment aims to advance a legislative reform agenda
that provides municipalities adequate protections for their tax investment
against the relocation of the professional sports teams.
Part II of this comment will provide a brief history of team relocations
and highlight some historical misfortunes which have come at the hands of
relocation efforts, showing the urgency in creating adequate protections.
Part III will analyze the effectiveness of eminent domain and contract terms
(both express and implied), legal theories previously used in attempts to
prevent a team’s relocation, as adequate protectionary measures. Part III will
also look at the current legislative efforts taken to protect against team
relocations, and the viability of such protections moving forward. Part IV
will conclude by proposing new legislation which, if enacted, will allow New
Jersey municipalities to protect themselves against losing their professional
sports franchises via relocation.
4
See Sports Law - Come Back, Shane: The Movement of Professional Sports Teams,
LAW
LIBRARY
–
AMERICAN
LAW
AND
LEGAL
INFORMATION,
http://law.jrank.org/pages/10434/Sports-Law-COME-BACK-SHANE-MOVEMENTPROFESSIONAL-SPORTS-TEAMS.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) (“Owning a
professional sports team is a risky, speculative endeavor, and owners must act to protect their
interests and maximize the values of their franchises.”).
5
Id. (“The owners of professional sports teams have been able to obtain generous deals
from city and state officials by threatening to move their franchises. If the owners do not
receive the support they seek, they move their team to a more accommodating city.”).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See generally Non-Relocation Agreement between the City of Erie and Buffalo Bills,
Inc.,
BUFFALO
BILLS
STADIUM
LEASE
(Dec.
21,
2012),
http://www2.erie.gov/exec/sites/www2.erie.gov.exec/files/uploads/Buffalo%
20Bills%20Non-Relocation%20Agreement.pdf (“[T]he Bills’ obligations under the NonRelocation Covenants are unique, are the essence of the bargain and are essential
consideration for this Agreement . . .”).
9
Ohio is the only state to enact such protections; see generally Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
9.67 (1996).
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This comment will look at the viability of creating protections against
the relocation of professional sports teams. Specifically, it posits that first,
eminent domain is not helpful in its present context because of violations to
the United States Constitution and complexity with the “just compensation”
and “public use” requirements. Second, the inclusion of express terms in the
municipality-team contract, while certainly a possible solution, can become
impractical in light of imbalances in bargaining power among teams and
cities. Third, imputing implied terms to the municipality-team contact, while
also possible, lacks the precision desired in view of the magnitude of the
contractual undertaking. Fourth, municipal use of tax funds to build or
improve a stadium by its nature provide the basis for requiring municipalities
to receive a value equivalent to the amount of tax funds given, before
allowing a team within their jurisdiction to relocate. Since this protection is
too important to succumb to a court’s discretion in application, New Jersey
must take the initiative to protect its municipalities by proposing full
legislation in the form of a statute covering this arena.
II. BACKGROUND/OVERVIEW
The idea of sport subsidies began in 1951, when then Major League of
Baseball (hereinafter “MLB”) commissioner, Ford Frick, decided the MLB’s
professional baseball teams were generating excess value for other
businesses in town, all of which the teams were unable to profit from through
gate or stadium advertising.10 As a solution, Frick demanded that the home
cities now support the league’s teams by building and maintaining new
stadiums, funded with the municipality’s own taxpayer money.11 Fastforward nearly seven decades later and Frick’s demands continue to resonate
just as loudly, if not louder, than they ever have.
During the twentieth century, more than $20 billion was spent on
professional ballparks, stadiums, and arenas.12 At least $14.7 billion of the
$20 billion spent (nearly seventy-four percent) has come in the form of
government subsidies.13 The problem has not improved with time either:
$5.2 billion of these government subsidies were given between 1989 and
1999 alone.14 From 2000 through the end of 2020, the National Football
League (hereinafter “NFL”) alone will have successfully opened sixteen
stadiums, fourteen of which together swallowed $5 billion in public
10

RODNEY D. FORT, SPORTS ECONOMICS 338 (2ND ED. 2006).
Id.
12
Raymond J. Keating, Sports Pork: The Costly Relationship between Major League
Sports
and
Government,
CATO
INSTITUTE
(Apr.
5,
1999),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa339.pdf.
13
Id.
14
Id.
11
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funding.15 This figure does not include taxpayer subsidized stadium
renovations by three other teams,16 amounting to $820 million.17 In 2017,
Nevada shook this landscape even further when it promised to give a recordbreaking amount of nearly $1 billion to lure the Oakland Raiders to Las
Vegas.18 The message has become loud and clear: when relocating, sport
teams seek money—especially “free” money in the form of taxpayer
funding—and try to secure as much as possible. Yet, as you will see,
promising these very coveted, large public contributions does not always
guarantee the municipality will have its beloved team in the long term.
In 1987, Bud Adams, owner of the then Houston Oilers, threatened to
relocate his NFL team unless the city improved their existing stadium.19
Fearful of losing the Oilers, Harris County20 met Adams’ demands and
committed $67 million in taxpayer funding for the requested
improvements.21 However, six short years later in 1993, even after securing
funding for their stadium improvements and while the improvements were
being made, Adams began petitioning Harris County for a completely new
stadium.22 When Adams’ request was rejected by then-mayor Bob Lanier,
Adams threatened to relocate the Oilers to Nashville, Tennessee.23 In August
of 1995, Adams opened negotiations with Nashville, without informing
Houston.24 Despite Mayor Lanier ultimately offering a new stadium, it was
too little, too late for Adams.25 Adams announced an agreement relocating
the Oilers to Nashville in November of 1995.26 Importantly, Nashville did
not require Adams to pay a single dime to erect the new facility.27

15
Kevin Seifert, With $6.7 billion in public money, NFL closes stadium era, ESPN (Mar.
28, 2017), http://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/234573/with-6700000000-inpublic-money-nfl-stadium-era-closes.
16
Id. (These teams include the Green Bay Packers, Chicago Bears, and Kansas City
Chiefs.).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Raymond J. Keating, The NFL Oilers: A Case Study in Corporate Welfare,
FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATION (Apr. 1, 1998), https://fee.org/articles/the-nfl-oilersa-case-study-in-corporate-welfare/.
20
Id. (Although named the “Houston Oilers,” the Oiler’s stadium was actually located
in Harris County, Texas.).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Raymond J. Keating, The NFL Oilers: A Case Study in Corporate Welfare,
FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATION (Apr. 1, 1998), https://fee.org/articles/the-nfl-oilersa-case-study-in-corporate-welfare/.
26
Id.
27
Id.
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Adams initially promised to play out the rest of the contract in the
Harris County stadium.28 However, after having low attendance numbers
during the 1996 season, Adams negotiated a buyout to play in Nashville two
seasons sooner.29 So Harris County, even after succumbing to the Oilers
demands and committing $67 million for stadium improvements, was
nevertheless stood up by a franchise owner looking to leverage the “legalized
larceny” landscape to garner tax breaks from local politicians.30 Thankfully,
the NFL awarded Harris County an expansion franchise in the Houston
Texans, which helped to shoulder the debt remaining from the Oiler’s
agreed-upon stadium improvements years before.31
At the same time, the Oakland Raiders were involved in a similar
situation. In 1995, the City of Oakland, California successfully courted the
Los Angeles Raiders by committing $200 million of taxpayer funds to
improve to the Oakland Coliseum.32 The Raiders would continue to play in
the Coliseum for more than twenty-three years until 2018, when the team
announced they would relocate.33 While more than two decades objectively
may appear as an adequate tenure, the improvements to the Oakland
Coliseum demanded by the Raiders in 1995 took twenty-five years to
complete.34 The improvements requested in 1995 are on track to be
completed by the end of 2020.35 On top of this, interest nearly doubled the
initial project cost to $350 million.36 In 2017, the total cost remaining for
the project was estimated to be $95 million, an amount which would be taken
from Oakland taxpayers while the Raiders enjoy greener pastures in Las
Vegas.37 With no team scheduled to play in the Coliseum at the time, the tax
obligation of $13 million per year is placed upon the taxpayers to satisfy the
property taxes through 2025.38 However, on December 23, 2019, the
Oakland Athletics came to the rescue by purchasing the city’s stake in the
Coliseum for $85 million.39 Although only acting as a temporary home as
28

Id.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Sports Law, supra note 4.
32
Patrick Redford, Oakland Taxpayers Will Still Be on The Hook For $163 Million After
The Raiders And Warriors Leave, DEADSPIN (Mar. 29, 2017), https://deadspin.com/oaklandtaxpayers-will-still-be-on-the-hook-for-163-mi-1793801493.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Matier & Ross, Taxpayers’ tab for Coliseum redo: It’s even worse than you knew,
S.F. CHRONICLE (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Taxpayerstab-for-Coliseum-redo-It-s-even-11034482.php.
37
Redford, supra note 32.
38
Redford, supra note 32.
39
CBS San Francisco, Alameda County Officials Approve Coliseum Ownership Sale To
29
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they build their own, new ballpark, the Athletics’ purchase allowed the
county to flip the payment and pay off the remaining debt obligations from
the 1995 renovations.40
These are among the most popular instances of team relocations, but
they just begin to scratch the surface.41 Recently, in December 2018,
Phoenix Suns owner Robert Sarver threatened to relocate his National
Basketball Association (hereinafter “NBA”) team.42 However, a vote on the
matter was tabled for a later time when the city found that “only [twenty]
percent of area voters were in favor of the deal . . . with [sixty-six] percent
opposed.”43 One month later, on January 23, 2019, the Suns agreed to a
twenty-three year deal with the Phoenix City Council to renovate their arena
instead of relocating.44 This situation only further proves that even today,
the threat of relocation remains an important issue for cities across the
country to address.
Relocation on its face appears to be quite positive, forging a new bond
between a municipality and the newly relocated team. Yet, in practice, it has
faced heavy opposition as far as the threat of relocation and actual practice
of relocation has been weaponized by team owners to extract concessions
from municipalities of the sort unlikely to redound to taxpayers’ best
interests. Municipalities have recently taken initiatives to mitigate, if not
preempt, such abuses by using various legal theories such as eminent domain
and contractual terms as measures to prevent certain relocation efforts. The
following section will look at the application of those theories and their
viability to prevent relocation measures.

Oakland
A’s,
CBS
NEWS
(Dec.
23,
2019),
https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2019/12/23/alameda-county-officials-approve-coliseumcomplex-sale-to-oakland-as/.
40
Id.
41
Robin Respaut, With NFL Rams gone, St. Louis still stuck with stadium debt, REUTERS
(Feb.
3,
2016),
https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-sports-nfl-stadiums-insightidUSKCN0VC0EP (“Seattle’s Kingdome bonds were retired only last year, 15 years after the
facility was imploded in 2000. Philadelphia has $160,000 left to pay on Veterans Stadium,
more than a decade after the facility was torn down. Debt from Indianapolis’ Hoosier Dome
- demolished in 2008 - still hadn’t been paid off in 2013, according to state filings.”).
42
Des Bieler, Phoenix Suns owner reportedly threatens to move team to Seattle or Las
Vegas,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Dec.
12,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2018/12/13/phoenix-suns-owner-reportedlythreatens-move-team-seattle-or-las-vegas/?utm_term=.50c9cc267920.
43
Id.
44
Bill Bradley, Phoenix vote ends speculation of Suns’ move to Las Vegas, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/basketball/phoenixvote-ends-speculation-of-suns-move-to-las-vegas-1580459/.
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III. ANALYSIS
Previous attempts to prevent a sports team’s relocation have largely
rested in eminent domain, contract terms, and in one case, state law. Under
these theories, individuals have sought to gain ownership of teams, land, and
stadiums themselves. However, how these legal theories ultimately stack up
to the adequate protectionary measures required today by municipalities, in
practice, remains unseen. Thus, the following analysis will highlight these
theories in practice, their benefits and shortcomings, and room, if any, for
improvement.
A. Eminent Domain
Eminent domain is a right bestowed upon both citizens and the
government to legally take private property for some public use.45 Vested
by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, eminent domain
has historically been used to take an individual’s private land and convert it
to a public use.46 The State of New Jersey allows vast use of eminent domain
by both the government and private individuals.47 In fact, the sole limitations
New Jersey places on eminent domain are for “just compensation” and
“public use.48 However, does a sports stadium count as public use?
In 1971, New Jersey enacted the New Jersey Sports & Exposition
Authority Law,49 which founded the New Jersey Sports & Exposition
Authority (hereinafter “Authority” or “NJSEA”). The Authority serves as
“an instrumentality of the State exercising public and essential governmental
functions.”50 The Authority was created in anticipation that professional
sports teams would relocate to New Jersey at the Meadowlands Sports
Complex.51 Since New Jersey allows for the use of eminent domain by
political subdivisions,52 the Authority would have the power to invoke
eminent domain and seize land at the site of the future Meadowlands
complex.53 Upon doubts from one official appointed within the group, the
Authority sought a declaratory judgment on the constitutional validity of the
law.54 The Superior Court held that the law was constitutional because “the
45

Eminent
Domain,
LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/eminent_domain (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
46
Id.
47
See generally N.J. Const., Art. I, par. 20.
48
Id. (“Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private
property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners.”).
49
N.J.S.A. § 5:10-1.
50
N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 580, 583 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1971).
51
Id. at 583.
52
N.J. Const., Art. IV, § 6, par. 3.
53
N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 580, 584 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1971).
54
Id.
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act is a reasonable exercise of the police power in that it is general law with
a public purpose and will greatly enhance the general welfare of the citizens
of New Jersey.”55 The court acknowledged “the view that the construction
and maintenance of stadiums and related facilities constitutes a public
purpose has received virtually universal approval in most jurisdictions.”56
The court further noted that “health, recreation and sports are encompassed
in and intimately related to the general welfare of a well-balanced state”57
and that “[o]ne of the tests of public use must surely be not so much how the
use is furnished but rather the right of people to receive and enjoy its
benefit.”58 Under this court’s broad interpretation of justified eminent
domain uses, a municipality may condemn private land in order to build a
sports complex for a professional sports team. This use of eminent domain
would presumably constitute a public purpose under this broad definition.
However, the court refrained from ruling whether a municipality could
condemn the actual sports team itself.
In 1982, Oakland, California attempted to invoke eminent domain as a
method to prevent the Oakland Raiders from relocating to Los Angeles.59
This time, unlike NJSEA, the city was attempting to condemn the team itself
instead of the facility’s land.60 The Supreme Court of California held that
“the acquisition and, indeed, the operation of a sports franchise may be an
appropriate municipal function.
If such valid public use can be
demonstrated, the statutes discussed herein afford City the power to acquire
by eminent domain any property necessary to accomplish that use.”61 Thus,
public use is key. Essential to the court’s holding was the idea that intangible
property may be condemned, drawing from a determination that “[a]
franchise is property, and nothing more.”62 Indeed, the court there reasoned
that it was “aware of nothing peculiar to a franchise which can class it higher,
or render it more sacred, than other property.”63
The court discussed the difference between condemning a team and
condemning the facility they play in.64 In its analysis, the court determined
there is no legal basis for concluding that the difference is legally substantial,
55

Id. at 640.
Id. at 598.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 63 (1982). This is the same
Raiders team that would return to Oakland in 1995, only to leave again in 2018.
60
Id. In N.J. Sports & Exposition, the authority was attempting to condemn the land
which the Meadowlands complex would be built, not a team.
61
Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
62
Id. at 66 (citing W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848)).
63
Id.
64
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.3d 60, 72 (1982).
56
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but also did not foreclose the trial court from determining the opposite:
Is the obvious difference between managing and
owning the facility in which the game is played, and
managing and owning the team which plays in the facility,
legally substantial? To date, respondents have not presented
a valid legal basis for concluding that it is, but we do not
foreclose the trial court’s reaching a different conclusion on
a fuller record.65
It is important to acknowledge that the Supreme Court of California is not
saying that a sports team undoubtedly will satisfy the public use requirement;
rather, the court is saying that so long as a public use is proven, the
acquisition and operation may rise to the level of a municipal function for
which eminent domain may be possible.66 Due to the court’s lack of a
concrete determination on whether a sports team itself can be condemned,
municipalities still find themselves lost on how eminent domain will provide
protections in relocating situations.
In 1984, the Baltimore Colts publicly considered relocating to
Indianapolis.67 In response, the Maryland General Assembly passed
emergency legislation which authorized Baltimore to condemn a sports
franchise under eminent domain.68 The legislature opined that if it could
pass this legislation prior to the Colts relocation, then the State could
successfully invoke eminent domain to seize the Colts and prevent the
relocation altogether.69 Before Maryland had the opportunity to pass this
emergency legislation though, Colts owner Jim Irsay heard of such
rumblings and proceeded to immediately move his team to Indianapolis.70
The team—and all its property—abandoned Baltimore one day before the
legislation was passed.71
Nevertheless, Baltimore still brought suit against the Colts, seeking to
enforce a condemnation of the team.72 The court ultimately held that
Baltimore lacked sufficient power to condemn the Colts because “just
compensation” is a crucial aspect of eminent domain and, at the time,
Baltimore had not made any payment to the Colts which constituted such
just compensation for the team.73 Furthermore, the court found that even

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 72.
Id.
Baltimore v. Balt. Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 279 (D. Md. 1985).
Id. at 280.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Baltimore v. Balt. Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 284 (D. Md. 1985).
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despite this shortcoming, “the Colts franchise had left Maryland by the time
the City instituted the condemnation proceedings,” and thus “the inescapable
conclusion is that the franchise is beyond the jurisdictional reach of
Baltimore City.”74 It is crucial to note that the court never explicitly stated
that it was impossible to invoke eminent domain to legally condemn a team.
However, Baltimore lacked the power to condemn the Colts because of a
lack of just compensation and the lack of the court’s jurisdiction over the
team, as the organization was no longer located in Maryland.75
One year later, in City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,76 the California
Court of Appeals struck Oakland’s exercise of eminent domain over the
city’s NFL franchise. The court held that condemning the Raiders through
eminent domain violated the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.77 The court concluded that “the burden that would be imposed
on interstate commerce outweighs the local interest in exercising statutory
eminent domain authority over the Raiders franchise.”78 The court also
recognized that if they were to permit condemnation of the Raiders through
eminent domain, it would necessarily implicate an indefinite bar on the
Raiders franchise from ever leaving Oakland, thus violating the commerce
clause and rending it unconstitutional.79 The majority of the court found that
the local interests pursued by Oakland were not sufficiently compelling to
justify eminent domain:
Plaintiff here does not seek to promote the health or
safety of its citizens, or even, as in Partee, promote fair
economic competition. Instead it seeks to act for what may
be presumed, for purposes of analysis, to be legitimate, but
less compelling reasons: to promote public recreation, social
welfare, and to secure related economic benefits, as well as
to best utilize the stadium in which the Raiders played.80
Under existing legal precedent at the time of this case, condemning a team
would be prohibited because its purposes in promoting public recreation,
social welfare, and economic benefits are insufficient to satisfy the public
use requirement.81 Thus, eminent domain failed to provide cities with an
appropriate protection against teams relocating because of uncertainty in
defining a “public use” and violations of the commerce clause.
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id.
Id. at 289.
See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985).
Id. at 154.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 158.
Id.
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To analyze whether these relocations efforts would fare differently
today, we must look at how eminent domain has evolved. In Kelo v. City of
New London, 82 a case decided nearly twenty years after City of Oakland, the
Supreme Court of the United States expanded the public use requirement
tremendously:
[T]he Court today significantly expands the meaning
of public use. . .it holds that the sovereign may take private
property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it
over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is
predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the
public—such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe
even aesthetic pleasure.83
Based on this expansion, seemingly any mere benefit to the public will be
sufficient to constitute public use, including aesthetics.84 Using this as a
backdrop, a municipality may argue that condemning a team through
eminent domain generates many secondary benefits, including revenue from
games and enjoyment on behalf of fans. Since increased city revenues and
enjoyment of games benefit the public at large, these benefits may arguably
constitute public use today, even if they would not have in the past. Such an
argument is likely to succeed as the Court in Kelo recognized that eminent
domain can be used to take property specifically designated for stadiums:
“the sovereign may transfer private property to private parties, often
common carriers, who make the property available for the public’s use—
such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium.”85
Bruce Ratner exposed this idea when he decided to move his team, the
New Jersey Nets, to Atlantic Yards in Brooklyn.86 In Goldstein v. Pataki,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
considered whether the government can utilize eminent domain to obtain
land for construction of an arena.87 The plan proposed by Ratner’s company
was to construct a twenty-two-acre development that would consist of
housing, office space, and parks surrounding a new arena.88 The local
government declared the area blighted and qualified Atlantic Yards as a land
use development project.89 By declaring the area blighted, the government
opened the door to utilizing eminent domain to legally take private property
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 501 (2005).
Id. at 501.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 498.
See generally Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256.
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within the designated area, including Plaintiff Daniel Goldstein’s
residence.90 The court found that the taking in question satisfied the public
use requirement.91 The court clarified its view of when the public use
requirement fails:
[A] taking fails the public use requirement if and only
if the uses offered to justify it are ‘palpably without
reasonable foundation,’ such as if (1) the ‘sole purpose’ of
the taking is to transfer property to a private party, or (2) the
asserted purpose of the taking is a ‘mere pretext’ for an
actual purpose to bestow a private benefit.92
Essentially, absent proof that the development will not provide benefits to
the area or evidence of a purely private driving interest, the public use
requirement will be met and eminent domain would be permissible.93 The
court further noted that “[w]hether the Project will in fact achieve this
[benefit] or any other objective is not a matter that this court may consider.”94
In other words, the public use requirement looks only to the intended public
use; whether that use is achieved does not truly matter. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this ruling, explaining that
courts should rarely intervene on whether a taking satisfies the public use
requirement: “‘[t]here is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a
legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the
eminent domain power is equated with the police power,’ but the Supreme
Court has repeatedly ‘made clear that it is “an extremely narrow” one.’”95
Under such reasoning, there is nothing to prevent a legislature from offering
slightly questionable public uses as reasoning to invoke eminent domain.
Further, since judicial review occurs in only narrow circumstances, this
questionable reasoning will likely succeed. Such a situation is exactly what
transpired in Goldstein.96 Thus, arguing that a team satisfies the expanded
public use requirements because the public can now enjoy their games and
benefit from the tourism influx suddenly carries legitimate weight.

90

Id.
Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 291.
92
Id. at 286. (citations omitted).
93
Id. at 288-89.
94
Id. at 287 n.12 (“Whether the Project will in fact achieve this or any other objective
is not a matter that this court may consider.”) (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 488 (2005) (“rejecting the argument that courts should require a ‘reasonable certainty’
that expected public benefits will accrue.”).
95
Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
96
See generally Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
91
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At this point, the only remaining element to justify eminent domain is
the payment of just compensation on behalf of the municipality.97 This
requirement ultimately becomes a major downfall of eminent domain as a
viable legal theory to protect against team relocations. The reason for this is
because the purchasing and selling market for teams is unique in that teams
often sell for prices in excess of what they are truly worth.98 Along with
immeasurable things like goodwill and history, part of the value paid for is
the perceived “trophy” value of the team.99 One financial analyst even
stated, “the value of professional sports franchises will continue to depend
on the willingness and availability of individuals wealthy enough to pay . . .
to own these “trophy” assets.”100
Nontangible property undoubtedly factors into the value of the team,
but due to the nature of the property, it is hard to clearly identify. Owners of
teams should, in theory, always argue for more value attributed to these
nontangible factors since it will inflate the value of the franchise altogether.
To the contrary, municipalities should always argue for less value because
this would take away some of the leverage which teams start with. Agreeing
to a satisfactory valuation is key since one does not want an outside party
weighing in; allowing a third party to unilaterally determine a sufficient
value of just compensation may result in the franchise being severely
undervalued or overvalued and, in both situations, one party loses. This
hurdle is simply too high and impractical to jump over in many cases.
Eminent domain may be a legally permissible way to prevent a team
relocation once satisfying the public use and just compensation
requirements. However, the nature of the just compensation requirement can
be quite speculative, rendering the taking’s power impractical, if not ill
advised in this setting. The following section examines real contracts used
by teams, highlighting the protections (or lack thereof) in each, and
analyzing the viability of employing contractual terms as a main
protectionary measure to relocation.
B. Contracts
An analysis of twenty-three stadium agreements between NFL teams
and their home cities, executed between 1984 and 2005, shows that every
single contract failed to contain explicit protections for the municipality
97

See N.J. Const., Art. I, par. 20. (“Individuals or private corporations shall not be
authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation first made to the
owners.”).
98
David
Turney,
Professional
Sports
Franchise
Valuation,
TOPTAL,
https://www.toptal.com/finance/mergers-and-acquisitions/sports-franchise-valuation.
99
Id.
100
Id.
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against a team relocation.101
Within every contract, the terms of the agreement can be either express
or implied.102 An express term is a term clearly spelled out in the contract,
while an implied term is one which is not actually written in the contract, but
implied into the contract by a court and enforceable as if it was expressly
written.103 Express terms are relatively straightforward; terms that are
expressly included within the contract are usually enforced.104 By putting
protections against relocation into the contract itself as express terms,
municipalities in theory should have a fully legally enforceable method to
invoke when their team attempts to relocate.105
The first contract analyzed is the Cleveland Browns 1996 agreement
with the City of Cleveland, precipitating the teams return.106 In the contract,
the parties agreed to give Cleveland the ability to terminate the contract upon
specific conditions.107 These conditions included default, dissolution of the
franchise, and bankruptcy, meaning that if the team defaulted on their loan,
dissolved, or went bankrupt, then Cleveland could rescind the contract
without penalty.108 This provision was unilateral, as only Cleveland had this
power.109
These conditions are unique, because they provide the
municipality with protections if the franchise were to fail or go under.
However, these parameters would not provide any protection to the
municipality in the case of relocation. Aside from a thirty-year lease term,
nothing within the contract protects the municipality’s public investment in
the Browns.110 Furthermore, a long lease term arguably lacks sufficient
101
See generally Professional Sports Facility Lease Summaries (NFL), (Summer 2012),
https://law.marquette.edu/national-sports-law-institute/professional-sports-facility-leasesummaries.
102
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 188 (1992) (“[I]t is true that the terms
to which the contracting parties give assent may be express or implied in their dealings . . . .”).
103
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4 cmt. a (“[j]ust as assent may be manifested
by words or other conduct, sometimes including silence, so intention to make a promise may
be manifested in language or by implication from other circumstances.”).
104
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(b) (“[E]xpress terms are given greater
weight than course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, course of
performance is given greater weight than course of dealing or usage of trade, and course of
dealing is given greater weight than usage of trade.”).
105
If a team were to relocate in violation of their contract, they would be liable under a
breach of contract theory.
106
Lease by Way of Concession between the City of Cleveland, Ohio and Nat’l Football
League, CLEVELAND BROWNS STADIUM LEASE SUMMARY (April 26, 1996),
https://law.marquette.edu/assets/sports-law/pdf/ls-nfl-cleveland.pdf [hereinafter “Browns
Contract”].
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Even as a year term, these are not even really protections because there are other ways
around it, like buyouts.
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power to even constitute a legitimate protection to relocation in itself,
evidenced through the Raiders relocating immediately despite having
multiple years left on their lease.111 Even with Cleveland’s express
termination term, in reality this protection is useless against relocation.
In 2012, the Buffalo Bills brought a glimmer of hope to using express
terms as a protectionary measure.112 The stadium contract executed in 2012
shows that both sides explicitly recognized that non-relocation clauses are
an “essential consideration” for agreements between teams and cities.113
Such an acknowledgement proves the magnitude of the situation and the
importance of protections. As part of their contract, Erie County specifically
negotiated for a binding non-relocation agreement, secured by right of
specific performance and backed by a $400 million fee.114 Essentially, this
provision means that if the Bills were to relocate while still under their lease,
Erie County could sue for specific performance, forcing the Bills to play out
the rest of their contract.115 Alternatively, Erie County could sue for damages
in the amount of $400 million—a figure worth more than ten times the
capital investment of $35 million the Bills provided.116 In return, the Bills
are permitted to buy themselves out of the last three years of the contract for
$28 million, but only after the first seven years of the lease have passed.117
The contract specifically prevents the Bills from (1) applying to play in a
different stadium; (2) moving the team to a new location; (3) selling the team
to an owner who intends to relocate; (4) entertaining offers to relocate the
team; and, (5) transferring or surrendering the team where they would play
their games in a different stadium or not at all.118
Since the Bills explicitly wrote this non-relocation term into the
contract, this term constitutes an express term.119 While encouraging as a
protectionary measure, this example poses itself as an outlier because of the
nature of the Bills contract. First, since this agreement included only
111

Keating, supra note 19.
Despite being called the Buffalo Bills, the Bill’s hometown is actually Erie County.
113
Non-Relocation Agreement between the City of Erie and Buffalo Bills, Inc., BUFFALO
BILLS
STADIUM
LEASE
(Dec.
21,
2012),
http://www2.erie.gov/exec/sites/www2.erie.gov.exec/files/uploads/Buffalo%20Bills%20No
n-Relocation %20Agreement.pdf.
114
Lease between the County of Erie and Buffalo Bills, Buffalo Bills Lease Terms
Summary (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www2.erie.gov/exec/index.php?q=buffalo-bills-leaseterms-summary.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
What
is
EXPRESS
TERM?,
BLACK’S
LAW
DICTIONARY,
https://thelawdictionary.org/express-term/ (“A rule in a contract that is clearly written or
spoken.”).
112
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improvements to the stadium, the cost and length of the project pales in
comparison to total relocation efforts.120 The contract here runs for merely
ten years, although the Bills have an option to buy themselves out of the
contract after year seven.121 For most cities, especially those courting a
brand-new team, ten years is unusually short when committing to building a
completely new stadium.122 The Bills were able to negotiate such a small
lease term because the agreement revolved around improvements to an
already existing stadium instead of construction of a new stadium, thus less
money was needed.123 With less money and a shorter lease length on the
table, negotiating for certain conditions—like protections on relocation—is
easier to accomplish because the parties are only bound by them for a few
years. On the other hand, if a team were to require a new $800 million
stadium—which is more likely when teams look to relocate124—then the
municipality will often seek much longer lease terms.125 Since a team is less
likely to breach a short term lease because the lease ends sooner, the
exorbitant $400 million penalty for relocating becomes less powerful. Also,
by giving the Bills an option to opt out of their contract after seven years,
these upgrades in reality need to be sufficient for just these first seven years,
at which point the Bills can uproot and relocate wherever they desire.126
Terms not expressly written in the agreement may be enforceable
too.127 Occasionally, courts will read unwritten terms into contracts, even if
the terms are not present within the four corners of the document.128 These
120

See generally Professional Sports Facility Lease Summaries (NFL), (Summer 2012),
https://law.marquette.edu/national-sports-law-institute/professional-sports-facility-leasesummaries.
121
See Lease between the County of Erie and Buffalo Bills, Buffalo Bills Lease Terms
Summary (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www2.erie.gov/exec/index.php?q=buffalo-bills-leaseterms-summary.
122
See Las Vegas Review-Journal, Stadium and rent details for all 32 NFL teams (Mar.
5, 2017, 10:28AM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/raiders-nfl/stadium-and-rentdetails-for-all-32-nfl-teams/ (showing the most recent new stadium leases including the
Atlanta Falcons in 2017, Minnesota Vikings in 2016, New York Giants in 2010, and New
York Jets in 2010, all negotiated lease terms of at least 30 years.).
123
The agreement centered on improvements to the Bills venue at the time, Ralph Wilson
Stadium. Ralph Wilson Stadium was renamed to New Era Field in 2015.
124
$800 million is a figure used solely for discussion purposes. However, new stadiums
often reach far above this number, including the new Las Vegas stadium discussed earlier
which will cost nearly $1 billion.
125
Las Vegas Review-Journal, supra note 122.
126
Albeit, the Bills would be required to pay their relocation fee first.
127
McCabe Rabin, P.A., What are the implied terms in a contract?, MCCABE RABIN,
P.A., https://www.mccaberabin.com/business-copyright-faq/what-are-the-implied-terms-ina-contract/.
128
Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 394 N.J. Super. 278 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007)
(“[W]hen a contract is found to have emanated from an agreement on essential material terms,
a court will also fill the gaps created by the parties’ silence by adding terms that accomplish
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are known as implied terms. New Jersey is one state which recognizes an
implied covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.129 This means that “a
party must act in a way that is honest and faithful to the agreed purposes of
the contract and consistent with the reasonable expectations of the
parties.”130 The Supreme Court of New Jersey described their stance on this
term in Sons of Thunder v. Borden, Inc.:
This Court has stated that “[i]n every contract there is
an implied covenant that ‘neither party shall do anything
which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right
of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract; in other
words, in every contract there exists an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.’”131
The term implies in all contracts, regardless of whether the parties explicitly
negotiated for the term.132 Since this term is implied in all contracts, it
necessarily applies in all sports team contracts as well.
Breach of this implied term requires an injury to the “fruits of the
contract” to one party.133 A “fruit” in this sense is “the equivalent of the
parties’ reasonable expectations that may or may not be set out expressly in
the contract.”134 In other words, the “fruits of the contract” are the expected
benefits that either side would receive if the contract was fully executed.
This could be anything from profits to real property, so long as it was a
reasonable expectation held by at least one party.135 When a team
purposefully relocates while still under their contract, it destroys the fruits of
the contract because the team is thereafter performing their service—the
fruits which they specifically contracted for with the original municipality—
in another area. Downstream fruits—fruits enjoyed indirectly from the
contract, such as goodwill—will also sour by a team’s relocation.136 As a

a result that was necessarily involved in the parties’ contractual undertaking.”).
129
See generally Sons of Thunder v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 420 (1997).
130
N.J. Model Civil Jury Charges § 4.10(J) (2011).
131
Sons of Thunder, 148 N.J. at 420 (1997); see also Hills v. Bank of Am., Civil Action
No. 13-4960 (ES) (MAH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32502 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2015).
132
Sons of Thunder, 148 N.J. at 420 (1997).
133
Id. at 418.
134
Tory Weigand, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts
in Massachusetts, 88 MASS. L. REV. 174-96, 182 (2004).
135
Parties can negotiate whatever expectations they desire, so what qualifies as an
expectation is case sensitive.
136
Branson Wright, Cleveland Browns Move to Baltimore Left City Stunned, left city
stunned,
angered:
PD
175th,
CLEVELAND.COM
(Apr.
30,
2017),
https://www.cleveland.com/ohio-sportsblog/2017/04/cleveland_browns_move_to_balti.html. (When the Browns relocated, “Modell
became Public Enemy No. 1 in Cleveland. Fans wore shirts with disparaging comments about
the owner.”).
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result, the municipality will suffer deprivation of all the fruits they contracted
for if a team were to completely relocate.
The important question remains whether such a term as defined can
apply in a way to provide cities with the adequate protections they require.
There are three situations in which breach of the implied covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing can apply:
(1) to allow the inclusion of additional terms and
conditions not expressly set forth in the contract, but
consistent with the parties’ contractual expectations; (2) to
allow redress for a contracting party’s bad-faith
performance of an agreement, when it is a pretext for the
exercise of a contractual right to terminate, even where the
defendant has not breached any express term; and (3) to
rectify a party’s unfair exercise of discretion regarding its
contract performance.137
Under the first application, the covenant will supply additional terms to the
contract so long as they are consistent with the parties’ expectations.138
However, if one party has different expectations regarding this term, it may
not be implied since it would be contrary to the party’s initial expectations
when they entered into the contract.139 In the case of a municipality courting
a sports team to their jurisdiction, it can usually be implied that the
municipality expects, or at the least hopes, that the team will remain there
for at least the foreseeable future.140 Teams however, by the mere fact that
relocation has occurred in the past (including multiple relocations by some
teams), seem to expect the possibility of future relocations. Due to differing
expectations, the implied covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing would
likely fail to imply adequate protections under the first application.
The second and third applications of the implied covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing provide even less support. Under the second theory,
a municipality would need to show a bad-faith performance by the team,
which sparks a contractual right to terminate.141 In this case, it is not
necessary to prove that the team actually breached any expressly written
term.142 An argument can be made on behalf of the municipality that
uprooting a team abruptly and in violation of their contract constitutes a bad137

Barrows v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 465 F. Supp. 2d 347, 365 (D.N.J. 2006).
Id.
139
Id.
140
By numerous teams requiring lease lengths in excess of thirty years, it suggests that
cities, especially at the creation of the contract, expect the team to remain there for a long
time.
141
Barrows, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 365.
142
This is true because the term is implied, so it is not required to exist expressly within
the contract.
138
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faith performance on which the city may have a contractual right to
terminate. The third theory applies a similar line of reasoning, requiring a
claim that the team unfairly exercised its discretion when relocating.143
One major, glaring flaw in the application of both theories revolves
around the language used to outline these applications. The first theory
explicitly allows for the “inclusion of additional terms,” while the second
and third theories instead seek to “redress” and “rectify” the situation.144 In
carefully choosing this language, the legislature allows the latter two theories
to take many forms of relief.145 With such discretion in the type of relief,
teams can seek redress most favorable to them—such as simply cutting a
check—instead of actually inserting and drafting an additional term which
they have limited power over writing.146 Such an ability completely
undermines the capability of municipalities to protect themselves in the first
place. With that in mind, it appears that the implied covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing present in all contracts provides protections to parties
unfairly injured, but its viability as a solution to protect against relocating
sport teams in general is lacking.
Since the current existing implied terms fail to give relocation
protections to municipalities, implication of a term by statute is the only
remaining option. Although the implied covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing began as a legal doctrine created by the courts, today the covenant
has gained enough support that it is codified in a statute as well.147 Similarly,
statutes throughout property,148 torts,149 and other areas of contract law150
have implied terms into contracts. The hurdle preventing implication of a
term by statute here is that no such statute exists.

143

Barrows, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (“(3) to rectify a party’s unfair exercise of discretion
regarding its contract performance.”).
144
Barrows, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 365.
145
Seeking redress or rectification only looks to remedy the situation in some way. These
ways are not limited in the same way that the first theory is limited to solving the situation by
only including additional terms. Thus, there are presumably many different ways that would
satisfy a redressing or rectifying the situation here.
146
Since the agreement has to be agreed to by both parties, both teams and cities are
limited in their power to add favorable terms because the other side can simply disagree. At
this point, teams may be more willing to cut a check and relocate than to take their chances
drafting the term.
147
See U.C.C. § 1-304.
148
See Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984) (holding that an implied warranty of
habitability exists in all residential leases).
149
See generally Ramsey v. Marutamaya Ogatsu Fireworks Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 247
(1977) (implying strict liability for inherently dangerous activities).
150
See U.C.C. § 2-309.

GULDNER(DO NOT DELETE)

364

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

4/4/2020 2:19 AM

[Vol. 44:2

As of 2018, the home city was a contractual party in seventeen of the
thirty-two (53%) NFL stadium leases.151 The NFL administers a hefty fee
on teams who relocate, acting as a deterrent to relocation.152 In fact, the NFL
even opposed the Raiders’ first relocation effort by unanimously voting
against the effort.153 Not only does the league’s animosity towards teams
relocating suggest that legislation in this area is necessary, but it is proven
by the fact that despite the league’s efforts against it, the Raiders were still
legally allowed to relocate and leave Oakland to foot the remaining bill.154
In its discussion about the threat of team relocations, the court in Raiders
went a step further to enlist the legislature in creating these protections:
The spectre of such local action throughout the state or
across the country demonstrates the need for uniform,
national regulation. In these circumstances (and apart from
other potential bases of commerce clause violation), to the
text of the note if relocation threatens disproportionate harm
to a local entity, regulation—if necessary—should come
from Congress.155
The peak of a team’s bargaining power lies within the ability to relocate at
increasingly lower costs to themselves through public funding, which
incidentally creates a pseudo black market for teams where they can
essentially “shop” between municipalities for the best benefits.156 However,
in order to propose effective legislation to solve the issue, it is important to
recall what legislation already exists.
151
See generally Professional Sports Facility Lease Summaries (NFL), (Summer 2012),
https://law.marquette.edu/national-sports-law-institute/professional-sports-facility-leasesummaries.
152
Luke Kerr-Dineen, Why NFL Relocation Fees are the Biggest Boondoggle in Sports,
FOR THE WIN (Mar. 28, 2017, 7:56AM), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2017/03/oakland-raiderslas-vegas-move-relocation-fees-350-million (“Relocation fees for each the Chargers’ and the
Rams’ move to Los Angeles were reportedly in the $600 million range per team.”).
153
L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Com. v. Nat’l Football League, 89 F.R.D. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(“The NFL meeting at which the league formally voted not to approve a transfer of the
Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles was held within the Central District.”).
154
See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
155
Id. at 157.
156
See generally Barry Wilner, The NFL tends to award Super Bowl hosting duties to
cities with new, state-of-the-art stadiums, BOSTON.COM (January 22, 2019),
https://www.boston.com/sports/nfl/2019/01/22/super-bowl-nfl-new-stadium-atlanta
(One
such benefit given to new stadiums is the opportunity to host the Super Bowl. The Atlanta
Falcons completed construction of their brand-new stadium in 2017, and the facility is slated
to host the 2019 Super Bowl); see also Sports Stadium Subsidies, The Heartland Institute,
https://www.heartland.org/topics/government-spending/stadium-subsidies/index.html (“In
the last few decades professional sports teams have also gained a great deal of bargaining
power with relocation becoming more easily accomplished where it was once expensive and
risky. Cities are now competing for new and relocating franchises, enticing teams with tax
breaks and stadium funding.”).
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C. Current Legislative Efforts
In the wake of the Browns relocation to Baltimore, Browns fans in
Cleveland were notably upset about how things unfolded.157 In an effort to
prevent the same heart-ripping tragedy in the future, Ohio created a statute
commonly known today as the Modell Rule.158 The Modell Rule, named
after Browns owner Art Modell, states the following:
No owner of a professional sports team that uses a taxsupported facility for most of its home games and receives
financial assistance from the state or a political subdivision
thereof shall cease playing most of its home games at the
facility and begin playing most of its home games elsewhere
unless the owner either:
(A) Enters into an agreement with the political
subdivision permitting the team to play most of its home
games elsewhere; or
(B) Gives the political subdivision in which the facility
is located not less than six months’ advance notice of the
owner’s intention to cease playing most of its home games
at the facility and, during the six months after such notice,
gives the political subdivision or any individual or group of
individuals who reside in the area the opportunity to
purchase the team.159
The Modell Rule effectively prevents the relocation of a sports team in Ohio
unless the team either receives explicit permission from the municipality to
relocate or gives the municipality advanced notice of leave,160 and
additionally offers to individuals from the area a right of first refusal to
purchase the team.161 The key aspect of this statute is its narrow scope; it
applies only to a professional sports team that “uses a tax-supported
facility . . . and receives financial assistance from the state or a political
subdivision.”162 Thus, under this statute, a team that plays in a privately built
stadium would be permitted to relocate wherever and whenever it saw fit.
157

Branson Wright, Cleveland Browns Move to Baltimore Left City Stunned, left city
stunned,
angered:
PD
175th,
CLEVELAND.COM
(Apr.
30,
2017),
https://www.cleveland.com/ohio-sportsblog/2017/04/cleveland_browns_move_to_balti.html.
158
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996).
159
Id.
160
Id. (Owners must give advanced notice of at least six months).
161
What is RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL?, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
https://thelawdictionary.org/right-of-first-refusal/ (“A right in a contract where the seller must
give the other party the chance to match the offer that a third party has given to buy a certain
asset.”).
162
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996) (emphasis added).
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International sports are no stranger to public ownership.163 The
Bundesliga, Germany’s top soccer league, instituted a rule in 1998 called the
50+1 Rule.164 The rule prevents football clubs in the Bundesliga from
engaging in interleague play if commercial investors own more than a 49%
stake in the company.165 In other words, the rule requires each team to be
more than 50% owned by the public, including fans.166 Before enacting the
rule, any kind of private ownership was forbidden.167 The Bundesliga’s
intent in implementing the rule was to prevent private investors from
attaining personal and dominant control of the team.168 Without dominant
control of the team, investors could not unilaterally prioritize profit over the
fans who form the backbones of the teams.169 Thus, the rule would prohibit
relocation without the support of fans and general public, who comprise a
majority ownership stake.
Since its enactment, the 50+1 Rule has been seemingly effective in the
Bundesliga, as the league now boasts the highest average attendances in
football across the world.170 Although successful in Germany, the adoption
of the same rule in the United States would not be feasible. The first reason
is that the rule controls soccer teams in Germany, who traditionally refrain
from relocating as often as United States sport teams.171 Second, as currently
situated, every professional team in the United States is privately owned
except for the NFL Green Bay Packers.172 Instituting a similar rule requiring
fan ownership of professional franchise ownership would require all the
existing private team owners to divest themselves of their ownership stake
in excess of over 50%.173 It is easy to see how such a situation would be at
163

See generally BUNDESLIGA, German soccer rules: 50+1 explained, bundesliga.com
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.bundesliga.com/en/news/Bundesliga/german-soccer-rules-501-fifty-plus-one-explained-466583.jsp.; See also
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
BUNDESLIGA, supra note 163.
170
BUNDESLIGA, supra note 163.
171
Bayer 04 Leverkusen, BayArena: A Stadium With A Long History, B AYER 04
LEVERKUSEN, https://www.bayer04.de/en-us/news/bayer04/bayarena-a-stadium-with-a-longhistory?vid=20180912_BayArena_W
Andel (Bayer Leverkusen, for example, has been in the same venue since 1958).
172
Kalyn Kahler, Green Bay Packers Inc., Owners of Green Bay Packers, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (July 17, 2018), https://www.si.com/nfl/green-bay-packers-shareholders-teamowners (“The Packers pride themselves on being the only publicly-owned, not-for-profit,
major league professional team in the United States.”).
173
This assumes that a grandfather provision would be ineffective in the United States
since all teams except the Green Bay Packers would be then be grandfathered in, rendering
the effort useless.
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least problematic, if not nearly impossible.174
Applying the Modell Rule and the 50+1 Rule, the relocations of the
Oilers, Raiders, and Browns today would have likely resulted in different
outcomes. For example, loyal Browns fans with majority ownership of the
team under the 50+1 Rule likely would have prevented management from
relocating the team to a different city.175 Even without the 50+1 rule, the
Modell Rule would give the Cleveland the ability to deny the team’s request
to relocate assuming that a potential buyer would exercise the right of first
refusal. However, neither the fans nor Cleveland, had such power.
Professional sports leagues in the United States are in a unique position.
The lack of protections against relocation have only come to light since
teams started to relocate, and such protections have so far originated only by
fans and city residents.176 While the only state with protections is Ohio,177
the other forty-nine states remain completely vulnerable to a team’s abrupt
relocation. As such, it is appropriate for New Jersey to create and enact
legislation that provides municipalities adequate protections against
franchise relocation. The following section proposes new legislation which
serves to protect such interests.
D. Legislation Proposal
Professional teams and leagues are not a single entity, so a solution does
not require a rule for the entire league at once.178 Instead, an approach
focusing on individual teams will provide a comprehensive solution without
setting off a missile to kill a mouse. Although not perfect, the Modell Rule
provides New Jersey with a firm foundation in which to construct its own
legislation giving municipalities protections. Similar to the Modell Rule,
New Jersey’s statute should limit its scope to sports teams that receive
financial assistance from the state or municipality.179 The Modell Rule also
requires the team to use a tax-supported facility for most of its home

174

Raphael Honigstein, What would happen if Bundesliga clubs scrapped ‘50+1’
Ownership?,
ESPN
(Mar.
9,
2018),
http://www.espn.com/soccer/germanbundesliga/10/blog/post/3412475/what-would-happen-if-bundesliga-clubs-scrapped-50+1ownership-rule (“[W]ell-situated clubs have found it incredibly hard to attract minority
shareholders who are happy to forego control.”).
175
Cleveland Browns: One of the best fan bases in the world, FOX SPORTS (Jun. 30,
2017), https://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/cleveland-browns-one-of-the-best-fan-bases-inthe-world-111216 (“But the love of the team has never wavered, as Browns fans take pride in
sticking with the team in hopes of a better tomorrow.”).
176
The Modell Rule was enacted by the citizens of Ohio through a referendum.
177
See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996).
178
L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388-89
(9th Cir. 1984).
179
See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996).
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games,180 but such a requirement makes this rule overly narrow. In requiring
both conditions simultaneously, a municipality could presumably allow a
team that plays in a private facility to receive financial assistance, but not
subject itself to the limitations on relocating. By limiting the scope just to
teams receiving financial assistance from the state or municipality, it would
necessarily cover teams that use taxpayer money to construct stadiums.
The Modell Rule specifically prevents the affected team from playing
“most of its home games” in a different location.181 This limitation also
poses too narrow of a restriction. Specifically, using the word “most” grants
the relocating team considerable leeway in working around the statute. The
word “most” by definition only requires a majority,182 meaning a team could
decide to play 49% of their games in a different location and comply with
the statute. By using a different word, such as “all,” it would prohibit a
relocation of any degree.
The Modell Rule’s second condition provides another glaring
weakness. This condition requires the team to give the municipality or state
advance notice of its intention to leave and further offers individuals in the
area a right of first refusal.183 Advance notice gives investors of teams an
option to get out by selling the team instead of relocating.184 Granting a right
of first refusal to individuals of the state or municipality attempts to shift
power back to the municipality by allowing the municipality to unilaterally
keep the team so long as it has a viable purchaser.185 However, in many
municipalities, there will not be an individual who is both willing and able
to buy the team. This is especially true as the value of teams have exploded
into the billions of dollars.186 Without anybody to step up, the team could
potentially still relocate even if the municipality did not want it to, simply
because the municipality did not have a buyer, a loophole which further
undermines the protections sought here.
Against the current landscape of professional sports teams’ movement
and fluidity, New Jersey should enact legislation giving its cities protections
against the relocation of their teams. Such a statutory protective model will

180

Id.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996).
182
Most, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/most.
183
See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996).
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Kurt Badenhausen, Full List: The World’s 50 Most Valuable Sports Teams of 2018,
FORBES
(Jul
18,
2018
10:36AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2018/07/18/full-list-the-worlds-50-mostvaluable-sports-teams-of-2018/#3fafbc586b0e (explaining there are eleven sports franchises
in the United States which are valued at $3 billion or more.).
181
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likely fall under Title 40 (Municipalities and Counties),187 and should use
Ohio’s Modell Rule as a rough foundation.188 The statute will read:
An owner of a professional sports team who receives
taxpayer backed funding on behalf of any state, city, or
political subdivision herein, is prohibited from relocating
their team to any location unless either:
(1) A benefit, equal in value to the total amount of
taxpayer backed funding, is repaid back the state,
city, or political subdivision.
a. The repayment period begins on the date
the funding is disbursed. The first payment
is due within 60 days after the date the
funding is disbursed.
i. For funding up to $100 million,
complete repayment is due 10
years from the date the loan is
disbursed.
ii. For funding between $100 and
$500
million,
complete
repayment is due 20 years from
the date the loan is disbursed.
iii. For funding above $500 million,
complete repayment is due 30
years from the date the loan is
disbursed.
iv. Extension of the repayment
period is prohibited unless a
subsequent agreement requests
improvements, repairs, or any
agreed upon event
(2) An agreement is reached with the state, city, or
political subdivision granting the team permission
to relocate.
Comments to this statute should define “relocating” to mean “playing
any of the team’s designated ‘home games’ in a facility other than its home
stadium.” This comment should further reserve an exception to this
definition for “specialty games,” which include games played at a neutral
location due to acts of God, charity events, or league initiatives.189 Most
187
188
189

N.J. Stat. § 40.
See generally Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 9.67 (1996).
League initiatives include international games played for the purpose of league
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importantly, however, the comments should define “benefit” to constitute
“any tangible or intangible property mutually agreed upon by the parties.”
By expanding the definition of benefit, this allows for a degree of creativity
for both sides in negotiating a deal because instead of repaying actual dollars,
teams can offer other, more specific benefits that tailor themselves to both
the owner and the municipality. These benefits can include anything like a
percentage of concession profits, voting power, investment in a particular
industry of the municipality, repairs to a blighted community, etc. For added
measure, the comments should also state that this term implies in all sports
law contracts, then allowing for implication of the term by statute in existing
contracts.
In terms of the municipality, this legislation gives them the ability to
leverage their geographical location advantageously in a way they have
never been able to before. At the same time, owners can now leverage their
expertise, connections, etc. in order to drive down their risk of repaying the
loan, especially with owners having massive expertise in some area. An
alternative way to think about this would be to compare it to a barter and
trade agreement. Take the following example as an illustration: owner A is
a wealthy man from Texas, who earned his fortune through construction.
Owner A wants to move his team, located in Texas, to a remote area of New
Jersey. Lacking a major city to play in, this may seem like a less attractive
place to move a team.
As a solution, the municipality may creatively ask for construction of
$250 million worth of townhouses near the stadium as “repayment” for a
$250 million loan. For the municipality, this is good because it creates new
housing, which significantly increases the population and attempts to
stimulate the economy. The construction request is also attractive to the
owner since, being in construction, they would presumably have
comparative and competitive advantages in this area, which would allow him
to build this housing cheaper and more efficiently than others. Even though
the real, raw value of the construction is $250 million at the end of the day,
the ability of the owner to “repay” this value in their area of expertise reduces
their perceived risk and allows them to build on their competitive
advantages. At this point, thanks to the new legislation, a remote area of
New Jersey, which usually would stand a limited chance of obtaining a
professional sports team, suddenly has a very realistic chance of courting
one.
Another key feature of this statute is the variable repayment period,
based on the total amount of taxpayer funds the municipality contributes.
This system provides advantages to both municipalities and team owners
growth.
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alike. Since the repayment periods are concretely set, the municipality does
not need to bargain for this term. The elimination of bargaining poses an
obvious benefit due to the fact that, as evidenced throughout this comment,
municipalities are often in an inferior bargaining position.190 Additionally,
this is beneficial for team owners since they can now take longevity into their
own hands. If an owner wants to be able to move their team readily, they
can simply take less than $100 million in tax funds and be able to freely
move in fewer years with no strings attached. If the owner repays the value
in a shorter amount of time, then they can relocate even sooner.
In creating these parameters, New Jersey will effectively secure
protections for municipalities against the relocation of professional sports
teams. The first condition of this proposed statute will require a return of a
benefit to the municipality, which is equal in value to the amount of taxpayer
funds given to the team. This condition purposefully uses and describes the
word “benefit” to allow both parties to define exactly what tangible or
intangible property constitutes the “benefit” given and received.191 A second
condition acts as a safety net for teams, allowing them to agree on their own
terms regarding a proposed relocation. By reserving this in just the team, it
ensures that a team could never relocate against the will of the municipality.
Utilized together, New Jersey municipalities should enjoy full protection of
their taxpayer funding without fear of relocation.
IV. CONCLUSION
This comment analyzed the landscape of sports team relocation and
how municipalities are unprotected from teams relocating, even after
securing millions of dollars in taxpayer funding. This comment did not
discuss whether the moral issues of cities themselves courting professional
teams or whether or not a municipality should be able to use tax money to
support a stadium. In fact, this comment assumed both are allowable. This
comment argued that eminent domain is a less than viable option because of
uncertainties surrounding the application of the “just compensation” and
“public use” requirements. Additionally, express terms and implied terms
are ineffective as adequate protections due to disproportionate bargaining
power between the municipality and team. Instead, the legislature must
enact its own statute to provide such protections when a municipality
190

Clifton B. Parker, Sports Stadiums Do Not Generate Significant Local Economic
Growth,
Stanford
Expert
Says,
STANFORD
NEWS
(July
30,
2015),
https://news.stanford.edu/news/2015/july/stadium-economics-noll-073015.html
(“Cities
have very little bargaining power with an NFL team. As long as there are cities without NFL
teams that are willing to subsidize a stadium, cities will have to pay part of the cost of a new
stadium.”).
191
Such benefits can include repayment of the taxpayer money, exclusive rights to use
the stadium, or whatever the parties see fair.
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contributes taxpayer funding to building or repairing a stadium. The statute
should state that if the team gets any such money, it must keep using the
home location until the municipality receives repayment of the funding in
some value. The terms for the repayment of the loan, however, are defined
by whatever the parties agree, whether through cash repayments or other
means. Through this route, the state would ensure that municipalities receive
adequate protections against relocation, allowing the team-municipality
relationship to flourish in the future.

